Gösgen nuclear power plant: 46 years without safety evidence - danger to the region!

Gösgen nuclear power plant: 46 years without safety evidence - danger to the region!

The Gösgen nuclear power plant, located near Basel, has been a worrying topic since its commissioning in 1979. In a recent report, the Swiss nuclear supervision Ensi admitted that the power plant has not met fundamental security requirements for 46 years. This discrepancy could have serious consequences, especially if you consider that a leak outside the reactor building could lead to the fact that the reactor core can no longer be chilled adequately. Such security deficiencies are not new and have already been determined at the turn of the millennium when the supervision was deceived by simplified calculations and incorrect claims of the operator.

The situation was poured at the end of May when the Gösgen nuclear power plant was closed due to the lack of safety evidence. Despite this decommissioning, Switzerland's power supply remained stable, which put the fears about the dependence on nuclear energy. Nevertheless, the risk of ambaying makes the power plant a critical point in Swiss energy policy. A possible core melting accident could not only endanger Switzerland, but also large parts of Germany, with the risk of radioactive contamination, which could affect Stuttgart and beyond.

Security deficits and instability of the pipes

According to the current report to the EnSI, the assumed stabilities of the cooling pipes in the Gösgen nuclear power plant are fundamentally wrong. Current findings show that, despite the previous knowledge, these pipes are more unstable than originally assumed. The risk of a serious accident is therefore higher than previously claimed. It would be necessary to organize far -reaching evacuations in Germany in the event of an acute incident within a few hours, which illustrates the dimension of the potential risk.

In 2024, the ENSI was registered as part of the inspections that the Gösgen nuclear power plant had 8 reporting occurrences. While most of these incidents have been classified as minor, the fact remains that the security checks and the combined chamber are essential for the assessment of the plant states. As an example, the federal nuclear security inspectorate (EnSI) cites the core power plants Beznau and Leibstadt, in which occurrences were also reported, but none to the extent critical security deficits, as observed in Gösgen.

The current discussion about the safety of the Gösgen safety is also influenced by future plans for radioactive waste and their disposal. In 2024, the Nagra plans two framework approval applications that affect long -term management of radioactive waste. The topic of security and the necessary evidence thus becomes a multi -layered concern among the population in a wider context.

The available information not only indicates the necessary, but also urgently required measures to improve the security standards. The discussion about the Gösgen nuclear power plant and its security deficiencies will certainly not end until significant progress is made.