What the term escalation is wrong about the Ukraine Russia conflict
What the term escalation is wrong about the Ukraine Russia conflict
For over 1,000 days, Russia has been waging war against Ukraine. President wladimir Putin has repeated that catastrophes- Possibly also nuclear - if the western ally Kievs equip Ukraine with the necessary weapons for self -defense and "escalate" the war. These threats have increased this month after the bid administration Kiev finally gave approval to use American long-distance weapons deep in Russia against goals.
Putin's threats and their consequences
In return, Putin Russia's nucleare doctrin nuclear-capable ballistic rockets fired on Ukraine. This message was clearly aimed at the supporters of Ukraine: Do not test us. However, despite these alarming developments, analysts believe that the events take place in a usual rhythm almost three years after the start of the war.
The reaction of the West to Ukrainian inquiries
Every time the Ukraine asked for help-first for tank Rel = "NOFOLLOW" TARGET = "_ Blank" href = "https://cnn.com/2024/04/europe/ukraine-f16s-zelensky-Arrival-intl/index.html" , cluster bombs and Long-distance weapons -hesitated to grant them, for fear that this could escalate the conflict and provoke a Russian reaction. But every time the West gave the demands of Ukraine, the most catastrophic threats in Russia failed to materialize. What was taboo for a week became normal in the next.
control strategies of the Kremlin
Despite the tightened threats of Putin's belief, analysts believe that the situation will not change fundamentally. They point out that the concerned response to the newly granted forces of Ukraine is another example of the successful strategy of the Kremlin to get the West to look at the conflict from Russian perspectives. As a result, every new attempt by Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression is perceived as a fundamental "escalation".
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said in a report that the Kremlin tries to make the West to make decisions in an "alternative reality" that gives Russia advantages in "real" events. Kateryna Stepanenko, co -author of the report, described this strategy as a revival of the Soviet concept of "reflexive control", through which a state imposes a false choice to his opponent, which runs out its interests.
The reaction to Russia's aggression
The continuing debates and delays in western military aid for Ukraine are a clear example of successful control by the Kremlin, said Stepanenko. In her opinion, the Kremlin brought the West to self -fright, despite regular Russian escalations in the war.
This strategy was also observed on Thursday when Russia started a large -scale attack on the Ukrainian power grid. Putin described the attack as the "answer of our site" on the decision of the bid administration of delivering long-distance weapons, whereby Russia often did not need an excuse for such attacks in the past.
political decisions and their consequences
The recent political changes in the western allies of Ukraine - which were incurred in the Russian military efforts after the inclusion of around 11,000 North Korean troops - did not constitute an escalation, as the Kremlin represents it, says Stepanenko. "Russia has launched an improvocated full war against Ukraine and escalates the conflict regularly to keep the initiative on the battlefield," she said.
The bid administration had sent Ukraine to Ukraine at the beginning of the year, also called Atacms, but set up strict conditions for their use: they were only allowed to be fired on Russian goals in occupied Ukraine, not on Russia's own territory. William Alberque, a former director of the NATO Center for Armor's Control, said that this policy has made little sense and was quite conducive to Russia's interest.
warfare and legal foundations
"by giving Atacms to Ukraine, but only allowing her to hit goals in the occupied Ukraine, we send Russia the news: 'If you only go a few meters across the border, you are sure'," Alberque told CNN. This leads to the absurd idea that Russia can attack anywhere in Ukraine, while Ukraine cannot hit the actual attackers if they are located across the border in Russia.
Ukraine acts as part of the laws of the armed conflict. As Poland's Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski The victim of aggression has also the right to the territory of To defend aggressors.
competitive lines and their importance
In view of the concerned reactions to the developments of the past week, it is often forgotten that Ukraine has been using self -developed drones into deep Russian territory for a long time and has already fired western weapons to areas that the Kremlin considers as its own. The decision to use somewhat longer western weapons is only a gradual but no fundamental change.For over a year, Kiev British Storm Shadows to meet goals in the crime, which has been occupied by Russia since 2014. For months, Kyiv Atacms was allowed to fire on Russian destinations in the occupied Ukraine. Russia sees these areas legally as its own and has threatened with "three considerable consequences", the Ukraine should attack them with western weapons.
Since May, Washington Kiev has also allowed the use of short-distance missiles to hit goals in Russia that are located near the border for the northeastern region of Charkiw of Ukraine. President Biden gave this decision green light, although Putin once again expressed similar atomic threats that saw such a step as potentially dangerous for "small densely populated countries".
conclusion: continuous challenges in conflict
"We repeatedly prove that crossing a wrong red line really does not result in any consequences," said Alberque. Nevertheless, there is a risk that these threats will prevent the West from making Ukraine available for self -defense. With a view to the ongoing threats, Albuquerque believes that there are few reasons to assume that the situation could fundamentally change this time. Donald Trump's possible election victory would also have a potentially positive effect for Russia, as this would further reduce the probability of real intervention by the USA or NATO-alliated.
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